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In response to the change in the security environment after 2014, militarily non-aligned 
Sweden and Finland are developing their defence cooperation with NATO and the USA and 
strengthening their bilateral defence relationship. Although a bilateral alliance is unlikely, the 
two states are suggesting that, were a situation of a conflict in the Nordic-Baltic region to 
occur, the hypothetical aggressor will need to take into account their cooperation and joint 
actions with NATO. The Northern Wind 2019 exercises carried out in March 2019, whose 
scenario includes the defence of northern Sweden, are a display of the interoperability of 
the Swedish and Finnish armed forces. However, the military synergy between Sweden and 
Finland is limited by the differences in their respective models of armed forces, years-long 
insufficient defence expenditure, and military personnel cuts.
Military cooperation and defence 
policies of Sweden and Finland
The Russian-Ukrainian war, the development 
of Russia’s military potential and the increase 
in NATO’s and the US’s military presence in the 
Nordic-Baltic region have all contributed to 
a redefinition of the security policies of Sweden 
and Finland. Sweden, which used to focus on 
global threats, began to place greater emphasis 
on security in the Baltic Sea region and to re-
build its capability of defending its own territo-
ry. Finland, for its part, which traditionally used 
to be focused on maintaining its independent 
defence capability, opened up to providing and 
receiving military assistance. It should be not-
ed that neither Sweden nor Finland have made 
attempts to join NATO, but they have strength-
ened their military cooperation with NATO as 
a whole and with those of its members that are 
of key importance in the context of defending 
the northern flank, i.e. mainly the USA but also 
the United Kingdom. The adoption of a more 
ambitious programme of Swedish-Finnish de-
fence cooperation was another element com-
plementing these actions. 
In May 2014, the two states announced their 
Action Plan for Deepened Defence Cooperation, 
a framework document heralding the develop-
ment of cooperation between all branches of 
the armed forces and the defence ministries1. 
The final report on deepened defence cooper-
ation between Finland and Sweden compiled 
a year later specified six key cooperation areas2. 
These include: cooperation of the navies, the air 
forces, the land forces, cooperation in logistics 
and in the supply of matériel, international co-
operation (joint participation in crisis manage-
1 Action Plan for Deepened Defence Cooperation, Ministry 
of Defence of Finland, May 2014, https://www.defmin.
fi/files/2833/ACTION_PLAN_FOR_DEEPENED_DEFENCE_
COOPERATION_BETWEEN_SWEDEN_AND_FINLAND.pdf
2 Final reports on deepened defence cooperation be-
tween Finland and Sweden, Ministry of Defence of Swe-
den, May 2015, https://www.government.se/49baf3/
globalassets/government/dokument/forsvarsdeparte-
mentet/final-reports-on-deepened-defence-coopera-
tion-between-finland-och-sweden.pdf
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ment operations and multinational forces) and 
cooperation in ensuring secure communication 
between the armed forces and the defence 
ministries. 
The framework memorandum of July 2018 is 
a political document that forms the basis for 
bilateral defence cooperation during peace-
time, crisis, and wartime3. The memorandum 
does not set any limitations on developing mil-
itary cooperation, nor does it contain any for-
mal mutual defence obligations. The current 
bilateral cooperation areas were supplement-
ed with host nation support (HNS), protection 
against weapons of mass destruction and hy-
brid threats, and strategic communication. 
Reasons for a military rapprochement 
between Sweden and Finland
Aside from unfavourable changes in the secu-
rity environment connected with the tension 
between Russia and NATO, catalysts for the 
development of Swedish-Finnish defence coop-
eration include the common political, military 
and economic interests of the two states. 
Political reasons: For Sweden and Finland, the 
development of bilateral defence cooperation 
is politically convenient because it does not 
raise controversy in their parliaments nor with-
in their societies the way military cooperation 
with NATO and with the USA does. Strength-
ening defence ties with a militarily non-aligned 
3 Memorandum of Understanding between the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Finland and the Government of 
the Kingdom of Sweden on Defence Cooperation, Minis-
try of Defence of Sweden, July 2018, www.government.
se/49fcef/globalassets/government/dokument/forsvars-
departementet/2018/mou-finnish-swedish-defence-co-
operation-20180625-signerad.pdf
partner does not require any fundamental re-
vision of the current security policy, the foun-
dation of which is to remain outside military 
alliances. Building joint military capabilities and 
developing international cooperation is partly 
treated (especially in Sweden) as compensation 
for insufficient military spending4. Moreover, 
the increasingly close Swedish-Finnish cooper-
ation is bringing benefits such as interest on 
the part of Washington in developing trilateral 
collaboration. This was evident in the Trilateral 
Statement of Intent regarding defence coopera-
tion between the USA, Sweden and Finland, an-
nounced in May 20185. The trilateral format and 
the expansion of Swedish-American military re-
lations carried out by the leftist government in 
Stockholm facilitate the process of Finnish cen-
tre-left political parties ‘growing accustomed’ 
to the idea of military cooperation with the 
USA. These parties continue to value the herit-
age of the Cold War policy of non-involvement 
in the rivalry between the great powers, and 
are reluctant to compromise Finland’s relations 
with Russia.
Military reasons: It is highly likely that, in the 
case of a conflict in the Baltic Sea region, the 
operational activity of the Swedish armed forc-
es would concentrate in the most densely pop-
ulated southern part of the country. This area 
is of key importance for maintaining strategic 
locations (e.g. Gotland), ensuring the capabili-
ty of hosting NATO troops and organising the 
transit of NATO assistance for the Baltic states6. 
In this scenario, Sweden would not have suffi-
cient forces at its disposal to defend the north-
ern part of the country, or to conduct forward 
defence operations in the Baltic states and in 
4 J. Gotkowska, ‘Szwedzko-fiński sojusz wojskowy?’, 
Analizy OSW, 14 May 2014, https://www.osw.waw.pl/
pl/publikacje/analizy/2014-05-14/szwedzko-finski-so-
jusz-wojskowy
5 Trilateral Statement of Intent, ‘Ministry of Defence of 
Finland’, May 2018, https://www.defmin.fi/files/4231/
Trilateral_Statement_of_Intent.pdf 
6 K. Neretnieks, ‘NATO and Scandinavian Strategic Inter-
dependence’, Karlis N, 4 October 2018, http://karlisn.
blogspot.com/2018/10/nato-and-scandinavian-strate-
gic.html?spref=tw
The tightening of Swedish-Finnish 
defence cooperation is facilitated by 
the common political, military and eco-
nomic interests of the two states. 
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Finland. Hence the importance of Finland as 
a country securing the northern flank and the 
Swedish interest in bilateral military coopera-
tion7. According to Sweden’s defence strategy 
for 2016–2020, adopted in 2015, it is crucial to 
tighten the country’s cooperation with Finland, 
as it is intended to result in joint operational 
planning and preparations for the defence of 
the territory of both states8.
From Helsinki’s point of view, the two states 
form a common strategic space, which is why 
Sweden is Finland’s major partner in foreign 
and security policy9. Finland does not intend 
to introduce limitations in its defence cooper-
ation with Sweden. It would like the gradual 
coordination of defence policies and the high 
level of armed forces interoperability in peace-
time to translate in the future into a joint war-
time operational plan. During a conflict with 
Russia, Sweden could play an important role 
in Finland’s defence operations (joint military 
actions, matériel and raw material supplies, en-
suring the transit of potential military aid from 
other states). This is due to Sweden’s geograph-
ical location, which places it at the centre of 
any potential conflict in the Baltic Sea region, 
including as the logistic and military hub of 
NATO’s operations. Cooperation with Sweden 
7 Despite the fact that Finland’s operation would focus on 
the southern part of the country, as with Sweden. 
8 ‘Sweden’s Defence Policy 2016 to 2020’, Ministry of 
Defence of Sweden, 1 June 2015, https://www.govern-
ment.se/globalassets/government/dokument/forsvars-
departementet/sweden_defence_policy_2016_to_2020
9 ‘Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Securi-
ty Policy’, Prime Minister’s Office Publications, 2016, 
https://valtioneuvosto.fi/documents/10616/1986338/
VNK J092016+en.pdf/b33c3703-29f4 -4cce -a910-
b05e32b676b9; ‘Government’s Defence Report’, Min-
istry of Defence of Finland, 2017, https://www.defmin.
fi/files/3688/J07_2017_Governments_Defence_Report_
Eng_PLM_160217.pdf 
also entails an increased capability to defend 
the Åland Islands which have demilitarised and 
neutralised status.
Economic reasons: The development of bi-
lateral defence cooperation is also intended 
at generating budget savings by joint interna-
tional involvement, joint military capabilities, 
and the procurement of armament and mili-
tary equipment. Cooperation between the re-
spective branches of armed forces is intended 
to enable the participation of joint units in cri-
sis management operations: for example the 
Swedish-Finnish Naval Task Group, the land 
forces brigade, the NH90 helicopter unit and 
military logistics. Closer Swedish-Finnish coop-
eration is in the interest of the strong Swedish 
defence industry, which is an important sup-
plier of armament and military equipment for 
the Finnish armed forces. After 2000, the arma-
ment and military equipment Finland bought 
from Sweden included infantry fighting vehi-
cles (the purchase of 102 CV9030 with a 50% 
offset), armoured personnel carriers, anti-ship, 
anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles, naval guns 
and radars10. However, Finland has a cautious 
approach to joint modernisation projects, fear-
ing the domination of Swedish companies and 
aiming to protect its own defence industry that 
mainly produces armament and equipment for 
land forces. Sweden’s withdrawal from the pur-
chase of the  co-developed AMOS mortar pro-
gramme (Patria and Hägglunds) was another 
negative experience. At present, Sweden and 
Finland are implementing a joint project involv-
ing the development and purchase of light an-
ti-submarine torpedoes, the Torpedsystem 47 
(they will be carried by new Finnish vessels)11.
10 Whereas the equipment that Sweden bought from Fin-
land included 280 Patria AMV and Pasi armoured per-
sonnel carriers (100% offset). V. Suominen, ‘Driving 
Forces Influencing Debate on Intensified Finnish-Swed-
ish Defence Cooperation’, Swedish National Defence 
College, 2014, http://fhs.diva-portal.org/smash/get/
diva2:720415/FULLTEXT01.pdf
11 R. Häggblom, ‘Torped 47 – Steel fishes back into Finnish 
service’, “Corporal Frisk”, 1 May 2018, https://corporal-
frisk.com/2018/05/01/torped-47-steel-fishes-back-into-
finnish-service/ 
Both states form a common strategic 
space and, during a conflict with Russia, 
Sweden could play an important role in 
Finland’s defence operations.
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In the air, at sea and on land:  
the cooperation of armed forces
After 2014, Sweden and Finland focused mainly 
on ensuring the full interoperability of their air 
and naval forces12. Their cooperation includes 
an advanced exercise programme, the ability to 
use each other’s bases, access to each other’s 
territory, and the capability to build a combined 
unit and to transfer operational command. 
The two countries’ navies intend to create 
a Swedish-Finnish Naval Task Group (SFNTG). 
The air forces, for their part, are expected to 
achieve a level of interoperability which would 
enable them to carry out joint operations with 
the full spectrum of capabilities (ensuring air 
superiority and providing air support to other 
branches of armed forces). In 2018–2019, there 
was an increase in cooperation between land 
forces, which previously had been less promi-
nent. It focuses on developing the concept of 
a combined brigade and an expanded exercise 
programme. Although military cooperation 
still lacks common wartime planning, Swed-
ish-Finnish military exercises are increasingly 
moving away from crisis management scenari-
os towards simulating joint defence operations 
in a high intensity conflict. 
Air forces. Cross-border exercises of the air 
forces of Sweden, Finland and Norway under 
the Nordic cooperation framework are organ-
ised almost weekly (Cross Border Training)13. 
12 The close cooperation between the navies of the two 
states has had the longest tradition among all branches 
of the armed forces, reaching back to the 1990s. C. Salo-
nius-Pasternak, ‘Deeper Defence Cooperation: Finland and 
Sweden Together Again?’, FIIA, 3 Decemeber 2017, https://
storage.googleapis.com/upi-live/2017/01/bp163.pdf
13 ‘International Activities Develop Air Force Capability’, 
Finnish Air Force, https://ilmavoimat.fi/en/internation-
al-cooperation
A few times annually they are expanded to in-
clude the participation of the USA. At the same 
time, Sweden and Finland are implementing 
their bilateral training programme within the 
co-operation between the Finnish and Swedish 
Air Forces (FISE). Since 2016, the two countries’ 
fighter jets have participated in their main na-
tional air force exercises: Ruska in Finland and 
Flygvapenövning in Sweden. Increasingly often 
Finnish jets carry out their operations from bas-
es located in Sweden and vice versa, including 
reserve and road bases. Initially, during exercis-
es, the two countries’ jets performed opponent 
roles, but since 2017 they have also practised 
joint air defence tasks14.
Navies. The joint Swedish-Finnish Naval Task 
Group (SFNTG) reached its initial operational 
capability in 2017. Its regular patrolling activity 
is planned for the next few years15. One exam-
ple of the SFNTG’s composition includes a staff 
element and several vessels, for example the 
Swedish Visby-class corvette and the Finnish 
Hamina-class missile boat, mine countermeas-
ures vessels and minelayers, landing crafts and 
auxiliary ships. Since 2015, as part of the im-
plementation of the SFNTG concept, both na-
vies have carried out annual bilateral exercises 
(SWEFINEX/FINSWEEX). The SFNTG participates 
in multinational manoeuvres on the Baltic Sea 
(Baltops, Northern Coast and Aurora). The sce-
narios of bilateral naval exercises were expand-
ed to include anti-submarine warfare, because 
in 2014–2015 both states recorded incidents 
14 ‘Ruska 17 and Baana 17 exercises taking place in Octo-
ber’, Finnish Air Force, 22 September 2017, http://ilmav 
oimat.fi/en/article/-/asset_publisher/ilmaoperaatiohar-
joi-tus-ruska-17-ja-lentotoimintaharjoitus-baana-17-jar-
jestetaan-lokakuussa; Finnish Defence Forces, ‘Finnish 
Air Force to Take Part in Sweden’s Flygvapenövning 18’, 
14 May 2018, https://puolustusvoimat.fi/en/article/-/asset_
publisher/1951206/ilmavoimat-mukana-ruotsin-flygvape-
novning-18-ilmaoperaatioharjoituksessa
15 J. Adamsson, From one exercise to the next, Swedish 
Armed Forces, 22 September 2017, https://www.fors-
varsmakten.se/en/news/2017/09/from-one-exercise-to-
the-next/; Finnish Defence Forces, ‘Finland and Sweden 
to participate in joint naval exercise’, 25 April 2016, 
https://puolustusvoimat.fi/en/article/-/asset_publish-
er/1951215/ruotsalais-suomalaisen-merellisen-taisteluo-
saston-alusyksikot-yhteisharjoitukseen
The scenarios of Swedish-Finnish military 
exercises increasingly often focus on joint 
defence operations in a high-end conflict.
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involving alien underwater activity in their ter-
ritorial waters. Unlike Finland, Sweden does 
have submarines, which increases the attrac-
tiveness of this type of exercise for the Finnish 
side16. Moreover, the necessity to develop ca-
pabilities for operations in archipelagic waters 
(both states have a skerry coastline) is a spur to 
cooperation between marines units (Amfibiere-
gementet and Uudenmaan prikaati) under the 
Swedish-Finnish Amphibious Task Unit (SFATU).
Land forces. Cooperation between the land 
forces has so far been less prominent. Its devel-
opment was hamstrung by divergent priorities 
– Sweden’s priority involved participation in cri-
sis management operations whereas Finland’s 
priority was the training of conscripts. This is 
why after 2014 the cooperation of land forces, 
focusing on territorial defence, is de facto be-
ing built from scratch17. Until recently, this lim-
ited cooperation was carried out mainly by the 
northernmost tactical formations (the Swedish 
Norrbotten regiment and the Finnish Jääkäripri-
kaati and Kainuun prikaati), where joint land 
forces action would be the most favourable in 
case of a conflict. Cooperation between the 
land forces gathered momentum during NA-
TO’s Trident Juncture manoeuvres organised 
in Norway in 2018, which was the first time 
16 The exercises carried out by the navies also include artil-
lery firing, amphibious assaults and mine countermeas-
ures. Cooperation also includes sea surveillance.
17 J. Sundström, ‘Finnish soldiers exercising in Boden, Swed-
ish Armed Forces’, 30 November 2015, https://www.
forsvarsmakten.se/en/news/2015/11/finnish-soldiers-ex-
ercising-in-boden/; ‘The cooperation between the Finnish 
and Swedish Armies progresses’, Finnish Army, 22 June 
2016, https://maavoimat.fi/en/article/-/asset_publisher/
suomen-ja-ruotsin-maavoimien-valinen-yhteistyo-kehittyy 
a Finnish unit took part in exercises integrated 
into a Swedish brigade18. The Swedish-organ-
ised Northern Wind 2019 exercises carried out 
in March 2019 have been another initiative that 
boosted the importance and the scale of coop-
eration between the two armies. Under these 
exercises, a Finnish battalion-size battlegroup 
with an armoured component (1,500 troops 
and 500 vehicles) formed part of a Swedish bri-
gade that carried out exercises with forces from 
the USA, the United Kingdom and Norway19. 
Since 2016, the cooperation of the land forces 
has included joint exercises carried out by ur-
ban warfare infantry battalions responsible for 
the defence of the capital cities. 
Other areas. Aside from the cooperation of the 
respective branches of armed forces, the Swed-
ish-Finnish defence cooperation also includes 
close contacts between defence ministries and 
command headquarters (annual talks between 
chiefs of staffs of land forces and chiefs of 
logistics). Both states are building mutual trust 
by way of a programme of exchange of offi-
cials and military personnel. They also invest in 
secure communication between their defence 
ministries and armed forces (the flow of clas-
sified information, improved situational aware-
ness) and cooperation in cyber-security. 
Towards a defence union?
Unless further negative changes in the two 
states’ security environment happen (e.g. the 
disintegration of NATO, the US’s withdraw-
al from NATO’s northern and eastern flanks, 
the erosion of European integration) then no 
serious debate on a bilateral defence alliance 
18 M. Nilsson, ‘Svenskt-finskt samarbete i Norge’, Swedish 
Armed Forces, 29 October 2018, https://www.forsvars-
makten.se/sv/aktuellt /2018/10/svenskt-finskt-samar-
bete-i-norge 
19 ‘Northern Wind: Swedish Army Exercise 2019’, Swedish 
Armed Forces, https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/ac-
tivities/exercises/northern-wind/; ‘Northern Wind 2019 
Exercise in Northern Sweden’, Finnish Army, https://
maavoimat.fi/en/northernwind19-en 
The Swedish-organised Northern Wind 
2019 exercises boost the importance and 
the scale of cooperation between the land 
forces of Sweden and Finland.
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should be expected20. In the upcoming years, 
Sweden and Finland will focus their bilateral 
cooperation on: ensuring a high level of in-
teroperability of all branches of armed forces, 
building a common situational awareness, and 
coordinating defence policies and wartime 
planning. These ‘special relations’ will form 
an important element of both states’ strategic 
communication. On the one hand, their open-
ness to military cooperation with NATO and 
the USA, including joint exercises, is proof of 
their readiness to act jointly with NATO in the 
case of a conflict in the region. On the other 
hand, Stockholm and Helsinki would like Mos-
cow to perceive their bilateral military coop-
eration as an informal alliance and a sign that 
they are willing and able to carry out joint de-
fence actions.
20 In fact, neither state needs any additional guarantees in 
order to conduct joint military actions in case of conflict. 
They can invoke Sweden’s declaration of solidarity, the 
EU’s mutual assistance clause and Finland’s readiness to 
provide and receive military aid stipulated in the law.
The Finnish national defence exercises planned 
for 2021 (modelled on Sweden’s Aurora 17 ex-
ercises) will be an opportunity to verify the pro-
gress in bilateral defence cooperation and set 
new goals. They will demonstrate which forces 
and in which directions Stockholm would be 
able to engage in operations involving the de-
fence of Finland. Also in 2021 Finland will make 
a decision regarding the purchase of new fight-
er jets which it plans to spend up to 10 billion 
euros on. Sweden has offered its JAS 39E Grip-
en fighter aircraft and will surely use econom-
ic and military arguments to lobby for SAAB’s 
bid (emphasising, for example: interoperability 
issue, the preparation of Swedish bases to ser-
vice Gripen jets, the adjustment of the aircraft 
to the conditions in the Nordic-Baltic region, 
the quick repair options). 
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The armed forces of Sweden and Finland
State Sweden Finland
Defence spending in billions of US$ (% of GDP) 5.470 (1.0%) 3.516 (1.4%)
Professional soldiers 14,800 8,000
Conscripts (annually) 4,000 20,000 – 25,000
Wartime strength 25,000 280,000
Tanks 129 180
Infantry fighting vehicles 354 212
Multiple rocket launchers - 75
Howitzers 8 775
Air defence systems 8 (short range) 24 (short range)
Major patrol vessels 9 4
Submarines 5 -
Helicopters 53 27
Fighter jets 97 62
Source: Compiled on the basis of the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex, web-
sites of the armed forces of Sweden and Finland, http://puolustusvoimat.fi/en/exchange-of-information, https://www.
forsvarsmakten.se and The Military Balance 2018, IISS, London 2018.
APPENDIX
